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Purpose of Thesis 
.• -
This topic was selected in response to Benjamin D. Ice's reading of Guilty: The Collapse of 
Criminal Justice (1996), by Judge Harold Rothwax. The issues raised in this book inspired Ben's 
study into the Supreme Court's effect on the efficiency and reliability of criminal justice. With 
apprehensions in regards to the necessity of the exclusionary rule as the remedy for police 
misconduct, Ben initially set out to critique the controversial decision of Miranda v. Arizona (1966). 
Throughout his study of the available empirical data, though, the focus of his thesis became more 
objective, and Ben tries to present this information in an impartial and complete study. 
This thesis begins with a focus on the two potential goals of the United States criminal 
justice system, crime control and due process guarantees. The thesis then studies the actual 
Miranda decision, presenting the underlying arguments. Finally, it compiles the empirical studies 
done on Miranda's impact and presents them to the reader. 
-
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-Formalism in the Judicial System; 
with a Focus on the Miranda Decision 
When the founders of the United States sat behind closed doors discussing the 
values their new government should be based on, they knew that the civil rights of its 
citizens occupied the top of their list. After living under the tyranny of England they 
feared the potential of a strong federal government. They wrote in the Federalist papers 
about their opinion of government actions without due process: 
To bereave a man of life ... or by violence to confiscate his estate, without 
accusation or trial, would be gross and notorious an act ... Confinement of 
the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are 
unknown or forgotten, is ... a ... dangerous engine of arbitrary 
government. (Beard, 1948: 362) 
The Bill of Rights represents their attitude and has become common knowledge 
because of the emphasis placed on it by United States citizens. They felt the need for a 
right to privacy, a right to pursue happiness and personal fulfillment, and a right for 
citizens to defend themselves against any act of government that would potentially put 
these rights into jeopardy. This thesis will focus on the rights of citizens, discussing how 
necessary they are and whether these rights have limited the effectiveness of our criminal 
justice system. 
Due Process Laws have been established to guarantee that we, the people, never 
have our rights violated. Our justice system was designed as an intense adversarial 
arrangement that provides the accused with every possible avenue to maintain 
innocence. From the moment police arrest a suspect through the sentencing hearing, it 
requires that the government go to extensive lengths to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the facts of a case and the accused's guilt. 
American idealism has led us, as a country, to fight for and defend our right to a 
presumption of innocence. We claim this right and cling to it so tightly that we 





After seeing many criminals go free, though, many people are speaking out, pulling the 
majority's attention back to another issue, the human right to live in a safe world. The 
universal right to be protected and safe is starting to rise in importance as victims, and a 
concerned public, begin to believe their deserved safety is being put in jeopardy as the 
criminally accused exercise their right to due process in our system, getting released from 
charges when procedural mistakes force dismissals of cases. Faith in our government, 
which was designed to protect the innocent, dwindles as people perceive guilty 
"criminals" walking out of courtrooms without having compensated society for their 
actions. 
A journalist named Karl Zinsmeister wrote an article, publicizing the current 
public attitude. Studying 1990 statistics put out by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, he 
claims that only 18% of people arrested for violent felonies are convicted and sentenced 
to at least one year in prison. This is true with only 10% of drug felony cases. Among the 
people arrested for homicide, only 49% were sentenced to a year or more behind bars. Of 
rapists, this applies to only 29%. The typical inmate being released, in that report, spent 
seventeen months in prison. This represents only 45% of the average original court-
ordered sentence. Zinsmeister closes his article by asking the popular question, That's 
our war on crime?" (Zinsmeister, 1990: 63) 
With four out of five prison inmates being repeat offenders, a cynical attitude has 
developed in our country to the point where some feel, "It's us [the public] against them 
[the criminals], society can't protect both." (Zinsmeister, 1990: 59) Victims demand that 
the government focus more on protecting and serving the majority as compared to 
ensuring the accused an opportunity to fair treatment. 
This thesis will explore the issues involved in deciding how much emphasis 
should be placed on our desire as individuals to be treated fairly by our government 
versus society's need to protect itself against criminal behavior. Citizens are calling out 
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for more emphasis to be put on getting offenders off the street, and protecting the 
innocent masses that have lived in fear, or a perceived threat of danger, throughout their 
lives. 
In an effort to simplify and better explore these issues, this thesis will focus on 
discussions of the Miranda warnings. It will reference a single Supreme Court decision 
with hopes to both appeal to common public knowledge of the Miranda subject, and to 
take advantage of already developed scholarly opinions available for study. The cases 
leading up to Ernesto Miranda, and the actual Miranda decision, have changed 
expectations of justice in the United States. This case has become so famous and 
awareness so common that the majority of citizens could list these warnings, if asked, due 
to the exposure they receive. 
History· prelude to Miranda 
The concept of human rights has developed throughout history. As time has 
progressed, so has the emphasis on the protection of individuals, and perceptions on the 
universal rights of human beings. This evolution continues and has shed a new light on 
victims and society's emphasis on crime. As the United States extends its arm abroad to 
apply its ideals to others, there has become more pressure to reduce suffering and 
problems in this country. Along with economic issues, crime victims are an important 
part in political battles. This continued emphasis on discovering and maintaining human 
rights offers a promising new future for victims and victimology. (Elias, 1986: 197-198) 
Two ideologies dominate the public's perception of our criminal justice system 
and its necessary goals. The Due Process Model and the Crime Control Model represent 
the two popular opinions about individual rights and the protection thereof. Herbert L. 
Packer (1968) labels and defines these models in his article Two Models of the Criminal 
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Process. The Due Process Model focuses on protecting the individual rights of the 
accused during the conviction process, while the Crime Control Model shifts the 
emphasis to the regulation of crime in society attempting to create an effective criminal 
justice system. Each of these pursue justice, but from opposing perspectives. 
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Packer (1968) writes that the modern American criminal justice system consists of 
a sequence of events which, taken in order, can lead to the conviction of the guilty 
accused. However, each of these steps along the way represent barriers which need 
overcome in order to progress to the next level. In theory, if the prosecution can 
successfully maneuver this obstacle course, then society can safely label the accused as 
guilty and punish them accordingly. 
This system seems fitting after reading the writings of the founding fathers and 
their desire for fair treatment under government. Following their travel to the new 
world, unjust and unfair government was precisely what they wanted to leave behind 
them. Remembering this, the system they designed emphasized the protection of rights 
and a requirement that a government go to great lengths to prove convictions of the 
accused. The criminal justice system they drafted focuses on reliability, attempting to 
prevent oppression and the violation of innocent people's rights. 
As time and technology progress certain things become evident under this 
criminal justice structure. First, as designed, the system takes a great deal of effort to 
run. In order to uphold citizens' rights the legal actors for the government have to take 
one step at a time, ensuring that they meet each right and requirement to ensure fairness 
and justice. This takes patience and places a limit on the efficiency of the proceedings. 
Under Due Process this does not represent a problem because this ideology places more 
emphasis on consistency and reliability than efficiency. It prefers to allow a guilty person 
to walk free by process of the proceedings than to place an innocent citizen behind bars. 
--
Due Process focuses on the presumption of innocence. (Packer: 1968) It places 
the burden of proof on the prosecution in a criminal case, giving the benefit of the doubt 
to the accused. Once again the past experiences of the founding fathers surface in this 
attempt to correct the injustice they had experienced in their history. They show a 
distrust and cynicism about the role government can play in its search for justice by 
designing the Due Process system full of legal requirements and checks in an attempt to 
guarantee the protection of their individual rights and the pursuits thereof. 
5 
The opposing view values safe communities and citizens. Not that the Due 
Process Model doesn't, but the Crime Control Model places more concern on protecting 
society as a whole from criminal offenders than on protecting the rights of the accused. 
(Packer: 1968) It places emphasis on efficiency, requesting that the criminal justice 
system find offenders and lock them away before they have the opportunity to violate the 
public again. This model recognizes the same phases in the justice process, but allows 
less protection of the accused in order to successfully implement a justice system that 
successfully reduces crime to a minimum and maintains that minimal crime level. 
Society's safety is Crime Control's number one goal. 
The Crime Control Model in no way promotes a presumption of guilt, but it does 
place a tremendous amount of faith in the investigative process. It believes that if an 
offender finds himself entering the system, there is a probability that they belong there. 
In other words, if a case makes it through the system to trial, more than likely the accused 
committed the crime if the judicial system hasn't thrown it out yet. This model 
emphasizes the preliminary stages in an investigation, and places faith in their reliability 
and predictability power. 
Interestingly, both models, even with their opposing ideologies, make similar 
assumptions along the road to their concept of justice. First, each recognizes the 
differences between a criminally accused and a criminally convicted. They mandate that 
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a conviction occur before stripping a person of their constitutional rights. Second, both 
limit the role that the government can take in the process of investigating and 
apprehending an accused. This protects the civil and human rights of an accused and 
attempts to safeguard against abuse of power. 
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The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows: A citizen shall 
not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." (Constitution of the United States, 
Fifth Amendment; Beard, 1948: 386) 
Literally, the Fifth Amendment suggests only that a prosecutor may not call a 
criminal defendant to testify or witness, or to take the witness stand in their own case. It 
has long been understood, however, that a defendant's rights expand to state that no one 
can be compelled to furnish evidence at any time that may be used against them, or may 
lead to evidence that may be used against them. (Uviller, 1996: 111) This assertion stems 
from a liberal interpretation of the right against self-incrimination. This right is not 
absolute; the availability of written documents may be required. (Uviller, 1996: 112) 
The Fifth Amendment uses the word II compelled" to describe the actions 
prohibited in questions. The definition of "compelled," as used in the Constitution, has 
drawn much debate. When the court eventually focused on it, they took it beyond the 
physical force or intimidation that most people easily see, and used it to encompass 
psychological compulsion as well. (Uviller, 1996: 111) 
Throughout history, interrogation was the primary method used to identify the 
persons threatening the general well-being, and political authorities have perceived it as 
a legitimate tool for law enforcement officials to use. They have believed that an 
opportunity to confess allowed an offender to begin rehabilitation by accepting blame, 
starting the journey back to becoming a respectable member of society. At the same time, 




them from becoming a test of endurance, a violation of human rights. Even in the Middle 
Ages, when torture was somewhat acceptable in interrogations, there were restrictions 
and standards to be followed. (Caplan, 1985: 1421) 
In fact, when a young Massachusetts drafted a proposed Massachusetts Bill of 
Rights it illustrated the attitude at the time. It said, "No man shall be forced by Torture to 
confess any Crime against himself ... unless it be in some Capital case where he first be 
fully convicted by clear and sufficient evidence to be guilty." Once convicted "he may be 
tortured, yet not with such Tortures as be Barbarous and inhumane." (Levy, Origins: 
345) 
Until recently, people felt that tough interrogations of suspects arrested on 
probably cause was an integral part of the investigative process. Justice Jackson wrote 
that the "interrogation of those who know something about the facts is the chief means to 
the solution of crime." (Mayers, Shall We: 92) People have followed the logic that only a 
guilty man knows where the murder weapon, concealed body, or burglary cache is, and 
the location of this evidence must be obtained through questioning. 
The feelings mentioned above were prevalent at a time when the public placed 
more confidence in police, when society saw criminals as a species apart rather than a 
member of their community gone bad, and when a confession was perceived as a 
statement of remorse, desperation, relief, or calculation. With the issues developed in the 
Miranda decision, the attention has turned from the suspect as a threat, to the suspect as a 
confessor where he is imagined by some as handicapped, a member of a minority group, 
or a person in a disadvantageous situation that became a victim. 
For most of their history, American police, while interrogating, have relied on 
force and duress to elicit confessions. (Leo,1992) In 1936 the Supreme Court outlawed 
the use of violent police tactics in the case of Brown v. Mississippi. At the time, an 




version of the rack, southern law enforcement officers often used strategies that left little 
room for evasion by a suspect. In Brawn, a sheriff beat up a suspect with a metal-buckled 
leather strap, obtaining a confession. The Supreme Court ruled that under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this was a trial by ordeal, and not fair. The 
conviction was reversed. 
This decision, though, left room for interpretation, for what about coercion of a 
less violent nature? The Court continued ihl journey in these issues when it reviewed 
Chambers v. Florida, in 1940. This case demanded a definition of due process. Police 
officers in Chambers threatened their suspect with mob violence as justice, and questioned 
Chambers continuously for five days and an entire night before his famous" sunrise 
confession." The Court ruled his confession was not "voluntary," and once again they 
reversed the conviction. 
As these issues developed, the emphasis changed from police effectiveness to 
individual due process rights. Once the Supreme Court began requiring that a 
"voluntary" confession must be obtained appropriately, the questions focused less on the 
truth of a confession, and more on whether there was any questionable conduct on the 
part of the police in attaining it. Professor Caplan illustrates this as a problem. In 
reference to the voluntariness standard used to measure the willingness of a confession, 
"its elusive boundaries made the admissibility of a confession difficult to predict." 
(Caplan, 1985: 1418) 
With all this, by the 1960's law enforcement was beginning to show a greater 
sensitivity to constitutional issues, and the rate of illegal and jeopardizing police behavior 
was on the decline. After nearly thirty years of judicial development, the voluntariness 
test was an evolving moral inquiry into what was decent and fair in police interrogation 
practices. (Rothwax,1996: 73) 
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Then, in 1962, the Supreme Court was presented with a case that could be 
referred to as the ideological forerunner to Miranda. In Gallegos v. Colorado, a fourteen 
year old Gallegos, along with two friends, followed an older man into a hotel, entered his 
room, assaulted him and stole $13. The three of them had been on a day-long crime spree 
and this man was their second assault of the day. He died from the wounds. Later, 
based on descriptions they had obtained, two juvenile officers spotted Gallegos on the 
street with his two younger brothers. The officers invited the boys to sit in their car. 
While there Gallegos quickly admitted to the assault and robbery. He repeated his 
confession the next day, and five days later he signed a confession. 
The behavior of the police was never called into question, and Gallegos was 
sentenced to life in prison. Before delivering his confession, Gallegos had been read his 
rights and willingly waived them. The problem that the Supreme Court had with the 
case was Gallegos's age of fourteen. The Court believed the officers should have allowed 
the parents to have access to their son during questioning. 
In their opinion, the Court also raised an issue that surprised officers and 
introduced a new perspective on offenders. The Court referred to the offender as "a 
person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding." This was 
shocking to many who asked why this inequality should be relevant to whether an 
otherwise voluntary confession is admissible as evidence. This statement is equivalent to 
saying that the defendant was no match for the officers. The police were smarter, and 
this wasn't fair to the defendant. This" inequality" the court developed provided the 
rationale that led to a reversal. Officers were shocked and bewildered. They believed 
that it should not be an equal contest in an interrogation room. Isn't inequality a tool 
used to gain leverage by police to convict an offender, they wondered. 
Two years later, in Escobedo v. Illinois this idea was, once again, developed. This 
time, the concept of right to counsel entered the picture as well. After shooting his 
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brother-in-law, Danny Escobedo was questioned for several hours about the killing 
before his attorney could arrange his release. He made no comments to the police, and he 
demanded his right to counsel. Ten days later, during a second interrogation, the police 
had some new information from another suspect, a man named DiGerlando, that pointed 
at Escobedo for pulling the trigger. Escobedo denied the fact. During this second 
interrogation, Escobedo was trying to acquire access to his attorney, and his attorney was 
also unsuccessfully trying to see him while being retained outside. 
The police challenged Escobedo to deny the charge to DiGerlando's face. When 
confronted, Escobedo shouted, "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it!" These words 
incriminated Escobedo for having first hand knowledge of the murder. 
The Court reversed Escobedo's conviction in a five-four decision. Their basis was the fact 
that Escobedo's attorney wasn't present at the time of the confession. This decision 
focused on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, not the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination which usually dominated these arguments. 
Circumstances and findings of Miranda 
In 1966, the capstone was laid on these arguments, in Miranda v. Arizona. 
Actually, Miranda was four cases consolidated for a single decision. (Rothwax,1996: 76) 
Ernesto Miranda, accused of rape, was almost not apprehended for this crime. While 
reporting to the police his victim, a young teenager, was shy and confused, sometimes 
contradicting herself. In fact, Miranda was placed in a lineup with two others, and the 
girl could not pick him out. 
Forced by the weak identification by the girl and desperate to solve the case, the 
police used a trick to try and get Miranda to confess. When the lineup was over Miranda 
asked, "How'd I do?" The officer replied, "You flunked." By the time the interrogation 
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that followed was over, two hours later, Miranda had not only confessed to the rape, but 
also to the attempted rape of a second person and attempted robbery of a third. The 
officer brought the girl into the interrogation room. Miranda responded with, "That's the 
girl." (Rothwax, 1996: 77) Once in court, Ernesto was convicted, based on his confession 
and the evidence presented by the prosecution. 
This whole time Miranda believed the girl had identified him in the lineup. 
However, this trickery was not the basis of the Supreme Court arguments. Justice 
Warren briefly touched on this issue in the majority opinion. It suggests that the 
government was not allowed to "persuade, trick, or cajole (the suspect) out of exercising 
his constitutional rights." (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.s. at 455) 
Reasoning underlying Miranda 
By studying the argumentation in Miranda v. Arizona we can learn what the legal 
actors in the case felt were the important issues. At the time of their arguments, all legal 
actors were keenly aware of Escobedo v. Illinois which had been decided two years 
previously, in 1964. The Escobedo case held that if a suspect confessed after having a 
request for counsel denied, that confession was excluded from evidence based on a 
violation of constitutional rights. Because of this focus on the Fifth Amendment an 
environment had been created, a backdrop where the topics being discussed for Miranda 
were already on the people's minds. 
It his request for certiorari, Miranda argued that his case ought to be reviewed by 
the Supreme Court "so that the current widely conflicting treatment of a basic 
constitutional right can be resolved and substantial and similar justice attained by all 
accused persons wherever they live." (Kurland, 1975: Petition for certiorari, 605) The 
opposing brief, issued by the state, also wanted the case to reach the Supreme Court. 
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"The respondent agrees wholeheartedly with the counsel for petitioner that the confusion 
in this are must be dispelled in the interest of all concerned." (Kurland, 1975: Response 
to petition for certiorari, 607) With both sides recognizing and arguing the importance of 
a Supreme Court ruling, it is no surprise that certiorari was granted. 
In addition, many parties presented amicus briefs to help develop the subject and 
sway the Court's decision. The National District Attorneys' Association argued that 
denial of defense counsel was not a violation of the accused's existing rights. 
Whatever the purported rule is, it is new. Prior to Escobedo, the denial of 
counsel at any stage preceding arraignment was, at the very most, a 
factor in the "totality of circumstances" on the issue of voluntariness. 
Thus, differing from Mapp v. Ohio ... and other cases which concerned 
fundamental rights, the denial of counsel, even upon request, was not a 
violation of any known constitutional precept. .. we embark on an 
uncharted constitutional course which leaves no opportunity for 
deviation .. .it is clear that here there is no stated law, no comfort of 
precedent. (Kurland, 1975: 761-762) 
The American Civil Liberties Union also submitted arguments, these on behalf of 
the soundness of the Escobedo decision, which was called into question in the above brief 
by the National District Attorneys Association. The ACLU and attorneys for Miranda 
emphasized that the right to counsel was a fundamental constitutional right. They 
claimed: 
It was within this context of police custodial interrogation aimed at 
eliciting a confession that the Court in Escobedo held that denying 
Escobedo the presence of counsel during the interrogation resulted in the 
confession being obtained in violation of his right not to be compelled to 
incriminate himself. Despite the furor raised in some corners about the 
revolutionary nature of this decision, it is submitted that the decision was 
not revolutionary, but rather the natural culmination of a series of cases. 
(Kurland, 1975: 725-726) 
In its decision, the Court used the same argument promoted by Miranda's 
attorneys and the ACLU. It states, "[w]e start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the 
premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application 
of principles long recognized." The Court ruled that the right to counsel and to have 
knowledge of one's rights stood as a requirement established in the Constitution. 
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The important question may be asked, "What is due process?" According to the 
Court's decision in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company, "the 
constitution contains no description of those processes which it was intended to allow or 
forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to ascertain whether it 
be due process." (59 U.s. 272, 276) Instead, judges are allowed to exercise discretion, 
considering how changes ought to be taken in account in their decisions. (Posner, 1987: 
23) Therefore, a judge is not required to uphold a procedure that was permissible 200 
years ago, nor are they required to overturn one that was unthinkable then. Jules B. 
Gerard, author of Capacity to Govern, says he may disagree with the judge's decision in a 
case, but he would not deny the judiciary power to render judgments based on discretion. 
(Gerard, 1989: 106) 
The reason due process requirements were implemented is for reliability in the 
judicial process. With these mandated procedures the cases which involve Constitutional 
violations should get weeded out throughout the process. Only cases that were properly 
processed reach a court verdict. This initiates the argument on exclusion of evidence. If 
it weren't for Fifth Amendment rights, suspects could be forced to take the stand, where a 
clever prosecutor could insinuate guilt. There is a cruelty in forcing an innocent person 
to defend themselves while their words are twisted and used in a context that suggests 
guilt. 
Miranda was a struggle between the due process rights of the accused and 
society's rights to justice. The authoritative figures had to analyze this struggle and 
decide which argument best represented the needs of the people and the requirements of 
the Constitution. 
To continue the study of the arguments in Miranda, the National District 
Attorneys' Association submitted a brief claiming that the public would not benefit from 




/I it will benefit only the recidivist and the professional criminal. The first offender ... will 
not be the beneficiaries. The innocent will take offense to the caution./I (Kurland,1975: 
766) 
The American Civil Liberties Union submitted a brief as well, designed to 
support their opposing opinion to the National District Attorneys Association. Focusing 
on the opposing argument, the ACLU's brief gave support to the claim that the Miranda 
rights would be beneficial. 
It seems hardly necessary to argue at length that typical police custodial 
interrogation designed to elicit a confession is inherently compelling -
inherently violative of the subject's privilege against self-incrimination. 
The subject is arrested and held incommunicado by the police until they 
are finished interrogating him. He is completely within their control, 
surrounded by hostile forces, and cut off - except at the whim of police -
from any contact with the outside world that might give him support. 
Indeed, such a situation may well have been created for the explicit 
purpose of making the subject confess against his will. (Kurland,1975: 
718) 
The ACLU further develops their argument by citing several police manuals 
designed to teach police officers the strategies of interrogations. This passage exemplifies 
the ACLU's claim that police are trained to downplay the rights of the accused. One 
manual read: 
If at all practicable, the interrogation should take place in the 
investigator's office or at least in a room of his own choice. The subject 
should be deprived of every psychological advantage. In his own home 
he may be confident, indignant, or recalcitrant. He is more keenly aware 
of his rights and more reluctant to tell of his indiscretions of criminal 
behavior within the walls of his home. Moreover his family and other 
friends are nearby, their presence lending moral support. In his own 
office, the investigator possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere 
suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law. (O'Hara, 1956, p. 99; 
quoted by the ACLU in Kurland, 1975: 719) 
The Supreme Court appreciated the arguments of the ACLU so much that in its 
opinion they referred to several of the same quotations used by the ACLU drawn from 




In designing the Miranda opinion, the Supreme Court attempted to alleviate 
certain pressures it felt were occurring in station houses across the country. The greatest 
concern focused on the voluntariness of confessions, and therefore their validity. An 
interrogation room can be an intimidating experience. Suspects have no one except 
police officers and detectives to talk to, no perceived freedom to come and go, no support 
from peers, and no tie to the outside. All these factors can convince a person to do "what 
it takes" to get out of a situation like that. 
The Court made several weighted decisions in Miranda which have forced law 
enforcement officers to think about the ruling every time they do their job. Miranda 
created a clause which automatically disqualifies evidence from being admissible if these 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are violated. Unless the fourfold warning is delivered, 
and absent a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver, any admission or confession 
will be excluded from evidence in subsequent trial proceedings. (Miranda v. Arizona) 
Another statement made by the Court reflects on public perceptions of law 
enforcement. Their opinion characterized police interrogations as manipulative and 
trickery. It suggests questionings are heavy handed and oppressive. Each of these 
characteristics contribute toward causing a suspect to lose their sense of freedom and 
tends toward them losing grasp and understanding of their constitutional rights. 
Without understanding their rights, a person may be more apt to allow themselves to be 
violated and temporarily ignorant of how they should be treated. (Miranda v. Arizona.) 
The court considers warning a custodial suspect as a safeguard, designed to protect a 
suspect's underlying Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If a suspect 
volunteers a statement, it is admissible. However, once a question is asked, any response 
is barred from evidence unless the Miranda warnings are given and the rights of the 




The reasoning underlying the Miranda decision was applied with several goals in 
mind. The judges believes the benefits would outweigh the costs if they created warnings 
to be given to suspects when they were arrested. The following are some of the benefits 
that have occurred. 
The Miranda decision has forced law enforcement officers to adjust, to reinvent 
their strategies and learn what could be done to downplay the Miranda rights to suspects. 
Ever adapting, the police have adopted several techniques which aid them in getting a 
suspect to waive their rights and talk. First, officers try to condition a suspect to answer 
their questions. By positively reinforcing their non-threatening status, they use jokes, 
friendly gestures, and subtle comments to open a suspect up. Second, officers de-
emphasize the potential importance of Miranda rights. By mentioning them in a 
nonchalant manner, they try to suggest that their are a minor formality that must be 
taken care of at the beginning in order to continue. Third, officers attempt to convince 
suspects that in their best interest, they should waive their rights and talk. Each of these 
techniques is designed to get a confession while working within the Miranda 
requirements. (Leo, 1996A) 
Along with the above adjustments, Miranda has had other impacts on policing as 
whole. First, the Miranda warnings have had a civilizing influence on police interrogation 
behavior, professionalizing police practices by raising their awareness of federal laws. 
Second, it has transformed the police culture and the perspective officers have of the 
general public. Through Miranda, the shared norms, values, and attitudes of police 
officers in America have become more acceptable and public friendly. Third, officers are 
more aware of constitutional rights, along with the citizens. Finally, police have been 
inspired to develop more specialized, sophisticated, and seemingly more effective 




Overall, these alterations in police behavior have impacted the citizens as well . 
Richard Leo, through his studies, established benefits that society has received through 
the Miranda controversy. First, the police profession has exercised more civility and 
practiced more restraint, increasing professionalism. Second, it publicized the emphasis 
on fairness in police procedures, a perception that helps police-citizen relations. Third, it 
has communicated, to the pubic, the moral and constitutional limits or methods police 
must apply when questioning citizens. Fourth, Miranda resulted in a more educated 
public, one more aware of its Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. (Leo, 1996A) 
While criticism still exists of the decisions made in the 1960s by the Warren 
Court, praise is offered by some to the efforts of that Supreme Court and its reasoning. 
When writing for the Court in 1984, Justice Byron White noted that that coercion was 
"inherent" in police interrogations where a suspect is in custody because the suspect "is 
painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator." 
(Minnesota v. Murphy, 420) Along the same idea, Justice David Souter, in 1990, wrote in 
Withraw v. Williams that "prophylactic though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial 
right." (Withraw v. Williams, 1752) 
Yale Kamisar agrees, claiming that Miranda did not, nor did it try to, limit police. 
He claims it allows a great deal of leniency for police when considering the extremes it 
could have taken. It left police with the freedom to listen to and act on volunteered 
statements, even if the volunteer was in custody. The Miranda rules allow police to obtain 
waivers of Fifth Amendment rights without the advice or presence of counselor a judicial 
officer, and without any "objective recordation of the proceedings." (Kamisar,1990: 580) 
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Criticism of reasoning 
The analysis of Miranda began before the Supreme Court ever made its decision. 
As the case was still being argued in the courts several renowned institutions made an 
effort to influence the court, submitting supplemental briefs to be considered. The 
National District Attorneys' Association listed several problems, in its brief, that it 
believed would occur if officers were required to read suspect's their rights. 
First, it claimed that the proposed ruling would add to the present burden of 
interrogation. They suggest that cases were already difficult enough to prove, and that a 
Miranda decision would lower the conviction rate even further. Second, they felt that all 
confessions would be tainted by the possibility of claimed police misconduct. Third, such 
a ruling creates other issues, including the manner police are required to assume when 
presenting the rights. Fourth, they claimed such a ruling would only benefit recidivists 
and professional criminals, and not the innocent. Fifth, the added requirements would 
toughen the already difficult job of a police officer, encouraging their misconduct to make 
cases. (Kurland,1975: 765-767) 
In his dissent Justice White stated his belief that due to Miranda many criminals 
would either not be tried at all or will be acquitted. (Miranda, 542) Some members of the 
community feel the same as Justice White did, drawing attention to what they perceive is 
an injustice. 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, roughly two-thirds of all violent 
crimes committed in the United States are committed by repeat offenders. One has to ask 
how many of these violent crimes committed by repeat offenders would still occur if 
technicalities, such as Miranda, were not installed in the system and did not reduce the 
effectiveness of prosecutors. (Cassell, 1995: 32) 
The public's outrage is surfacing, and with it comes the common arguments and 




many people cry. The struggle, though, is providing victims with rights without 
compromising those that have been established to protect the defendant. While it is not 
necessary to sacrifice one for the other, it will take more effort and resources than 
previously committed to provide justice for victims and still guard the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to criminal suspects. The presumption of 
innocence, the right to be represented by counsel, the right to a speedy trial, and the right 
not to be forced into a confession would all be jeopardized if the court placed any less 
emphasis on the defendant. 
In an emotional and powerful statement, Robert Sullivan communicates his 
perspective on the sacrifices being made for due process: 
We as a society have breathed an ether that has dulled our senses and has almost 
put us to sleep if we believe that it is necessary to free nine guilty men rather 
than convict one innocent person. We must address each case independently 
with reasonableness and common sense so that the nine victims who have also 
appealed to the system for support and vindication are not left wanting. 
(Sullivan, 1988: 128) 
The impact of this decision has been substantial. In 1976, a poll was taken of 
members of the American Bar Association. The goal of the poll was to determine 
"milestone events" in American legal history. The members voted Miranda as having the 
fourth highest ranking in overall importance, with no criminal law decision placing 
higher. (Caplan, 1985: 1417) This sentiment shows itself in the early opinions of the legal 
actors. 
Initially, police felt it limited their investigation abilities, and politicians blamed 
the rising crime rate on Miranda. Richard Nixon went so far as to describe it, along with 
other Warren Court decisions, as a victory of "crime forces" over "peace forces." 
Congress even tried to invalidate its holding in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968. (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968) 
The Reagan Administration also made a stab at Miranda. The u.S. Department of 
Justice's Office of Legal Policy, under the Reagan Administration, characterized the 
---
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decision as illegitimate in a 120 page report, in which they urged the Supreme Court to 
overrule Miranda completely. (Office of Legal Policy, 1986) 
While serving as the Attorney General of the United States, Edwin Meese made a 
statement reflecting this continuous concern. 
The Miranda decision was wrong. We managed very well in this country 
for 175 years without it. Its practical effect is to prevent the police from 
talking to the person who knows the most about the crime - namely, the 
perpetrator. As it stands under Miranda, if the police obtain a statement 
from that person in the course of the initial interrogation, the statement 
may be thrown out at the trial. Therefore, Miranda only helps guilty 
defendants. (Meese, Reagan: 67) 
Recently Joseph Grano claimed that Miranda has created a cynicism among legal 
actors and public officials. By establishing the Miranda rules, the Court elevated concerns 
for formal justice over concerns for substantive justice. This results in decisions 
conflicting with our substantive ideals, leaving law enforcement officers frustrated when 
their efforts are thrown out because of legal technicalities. (Grano, 1993) Miranda shifted 
legal inquiry from whether the confession was voluntary to whether Miranda rights were 
voluntarily waived. (Malone, 1986) According to Grano and Malone this change in 
emphasis contradicts the original goal of the law enforcement officer, to fight and prevent 
crime, and turns their job into an impossible and unrewarding assignment where little 
appreciation is experienced. 
Miranda has been referred to by some as the "fox-hunter's argument." (Rothwax, 
1996: 79) This creates the image that the Court attempted to level the playing field, to 
give the defendant a "sporting chance," by not letting the smarter and more prepared 
officer take advantage of the conditions. Why, though, would the court attempt to create 
this equality? Perhaps this reference to equality has egalitarian notions. It is perhaps 
unfair that less sophisticated people would not have the same knowledge, and therefore 





Perhaps the Court was attempting to stretch the adversarial basis of our legal 
system into the station house. The problem is that a police investigation is not 
adversarial, but inquisitorial in nature. Police officers are charged not with administering 
justice, but with searching through information to establish facts. By deciding in favor of 
Miranda and creating the warnings, the Court has tightly restricted officers' ability to 
probe and search for the truth. 
Judge Rothwax, who views the rigidity in the judicial system as negative, calls 
Miranda lithe triumph of formalism." 
In my judgment, Miranda should be repudiated. It's bad constitutional 
law. It's ill-conceived policy. And most grievous, it has created a 
jurisprudence of formalism ... With Miranda, appellate and trial courts are 
forced to decipher and apply rigid principles - often with no 
consideration of the Fifth Amendment's underlying concern with 
compulsion. We have come to the point where actual coercion isn't even 
the issue. (Rothwax, 1996: 82) 
Judge Rothwax gives an example of this formalism. In a 1984 New York case, 
People v. Ferro, the defendant was arrested for a residential robbery of furs that developed 
into a murder. The detective in the case, after obtaining the furs from a codefendant's 
apartment, placed the furs in front of Ferro. Ferro, believing the officer had evidence that 
he committed the crime, offered incriminating evidence. He was convicted of murder, 
but his conviction was overturned on appeal. The appellate court stated that the 
detective who interrogated Ferro should have known Ferro would likely respond to the 
furs placed in front of him and should hear his rights. A convicted murderer went free 
for this violation through interpretation. 
Judge Rothwax, in his book, states five reasons he believes Miranda should be 
overruled. First, he believes that the voluntariness test met the needs of the Court. If 
true, this would prove the 1966 Miranda opinion to be unwise and unnecessary. Second, 
it has introduced novel conceptions on the proper relationship between a criminal 
suspect and a law enforcement officer that has resulted in a hazardous judicial detour. 
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He believes the Court initiated the movement to empower criminal suspects against the 
police, with the Court believing that suspects were an underdog in a battle that should be 
made on equal grounds. Third, Miranda suggests that law enforcement is a game of 
chance in which the defendant should always have some prospect of winning. Law 
enforcement is based on consistent investigative techniques designed to lead to the truth. 
Police investigation is not a gamble, throwing accusations at people. Fourth, Miranda was 
a poor choice in a prime opportunity to restrain unlawful police conduct. He suggests 
that other options were not honestly pursued. Fifth, Miranda failed to develop into an 
understood and practiced law. It has technical issues that continue to arise about its 
meaning and scope. (Rothwax, 1996: 86) 
He closes his argument by saying that the Court should not fear overruling 
Miranda, believing it will lead back to the Dark Ages of police abuse. He believes that as 
long as we our strong in our commitment to freedom and the protection of rights, 
honesty and fairness will be achieved. The key is the practice of criminal justice, not the 
formality. 
In his book Confessions, Truth and the Law (1993) Professor Grano argues the 
extent of Miranda as a mistake. 
Miranda does not have the virtue of furthering good policy. On the 
contrary, its antipathy to police interrogation and self-incrimination 
undermines ... legitimate and weighty societal interests in law 
enforcement. Its ideology sits as a time bomb waiting to be triggered by 
a more sympathetic court. 
Gerald Caplan has flatly stated that Miranda was not a wise or necessary 
decision, nor has it proved to be a harmless one, as some scholars argue. (Caplan, 1985: 
1419) These scholars that Caplan refer to argue that considerable empirical evidence 
supports that when the warnings are given, they are rarely sufficient to overcome the 
"atmosphere of coercion" in custodial interrogation. They also say that the warnings are 
--
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not fully understood by suspects being arrested, and that a large majority of suspected 
offenders waive their rights to counsel and silence. (Allen, The Judicial: 518) 
Factual assertions regarding Miranda 
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The current status of our society is demanding that the officials start thinking in 
terms of changing laws to make streets safer. What is being said? "Stop plea 
bargaining." With less reduced sentences and fewer bargained down charges less 
criminals would be on this street. This is not an option, though. In 1991, the Criminal 
Court of the City of New York had 1,000 cases a day to be resolved. At the time they had 
approximately 80 judges on that court, which allowed about four and a half minutes per 
case (Wachtler, 1991). If plea bargains were eliminated the judicial system would 
completely stop due to an overload of the court system. 
"Put offenders in jail, and we'll stop crime." This also is not a realistic solution to 
limiting crime. In 1991, the New York penitentiary system held 55,000 people. That 
number has increased at such an incredible rate that prisons can not be built fast enough. 
Prisons don't have room for more offenders. 
According to Fred Inbau, when the Supreme Court ruled on Miranda it was 
creating laws for a problem that "was already fading in the past." (Inbau,1988: 31) 
According to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of 
Justice, in 1966 the third degree was almost nonexistent, and had been virtually 
abandoned by the police. (President's Commission, 1967: 93) In an empirical 
assessment, Professor Gerald Rosenberg stated that, "Evidence is hard to come by but 
what evidence there is suggests that any reductions that have been achieved in police 




Additionally, Justice Harlan made a point in his Miranda dissent. He states that 
Miranda was not designed to eliminate coerced confessions. He says: liThe new rules are 
not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of 
coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and 
destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers." (Miranda v. Arizona, 505) He 
believes that there is no line of causation connecting Miranda, a reduction in police 
brutality, and falling clearance rates. 
Charles E. Silberman developed his opinions on criminal justice in the 1970' s, and 
focused on the exclusionary rule and its affect. Stating his opinion, he says that repealing 
the Exclusionary rule would not make police any more effective. Despite early 
complaints, he said police have not been handcuffed by the Warren Court, or its rulings. 
With the exception of minor drug offenses, he believes no evidence suggests that police 
make fewer arrests, or that prosecutors secure fewer convictions. (Silberman, 1978: 201) 
While participating in routine patrol, as a spectator, Silberman recorded his 
experiences. One evening six incidents occurred while patrolling. None of the suspects 
or offenders received Miranda warnings. One guy confessed, but the officer wasn't 
worried about admissibility because he was confident the admission would be repeated 
at the station house after the rights were read. According to Silberman, if challenged, the 
officer would simply have lied, testifying that he gave the Miranda warning before 
beginning questioning. It would have been the word of an officer against that of a 
suspected criminal. (Silberman, 1978: 178) 
Research testing factual assertions 
Immediately following the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, a series of studies was 
done to determine Miranda's impact. Known as the Miranda Impact Studies, they were 
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carried out from 1966 to 1973. These studies found that not only did the Miranda decision 
not adversely affect the ability of police to control crime, but they showed that the 
Miranda warnings achieved several designated goals designated by the Court. A 
summary of the Miranda Impact Studies' claims follows. 
First, the studies found that after an initial adjustment phase, police officers 
successfully adjusted to the new requirements. Second, despite expectations, suspects 
frequently waived their rights to attain counsel and remain silent and chose to speak to 
interrogating officers. Third, once a waiver was obtained, the strategies and techniques 
of interrogating officers did not change from those prior to the Miranda decision. Fourth, 
suspects continued to produce confessions and incriminating evidence, although 
sometimes at a lower rate of frequency. Fifth, confession rates dropped, but conviction 
rates remained steady. (Leo, 1996A) 
The Miranda Impact Studies, however, are considered by most scholars as 
outdated and almost completely irrelevant. Scholars claim they are neither exhaustive 
nor conclusive. This void left by unreliable studies has led Richard Leo (1996A, 1996B), 
along with Paul Cassell (1995, 1996A, 1996B, 1996C), Stephen Schoehlhofer (1981, 1996A, 
1996B, 1997), and others to rediscover the old statistics and establish their true meaning. 
In his article "Questioning Miranda," Gerald Caplan (1985) evaluates some of the 
studies done. His experiences show that Miranda took a toll on policing and its 
effectiveness. Caplan refers to a Pittsburgh study as the best measure of Miranda's impact 
on crime detection. Pittsburgh, with a significant crime problem, compared before-and-
after rates of confession in an effort to distinguish what variations in confession rates, if 
any, occurred. All offenses investigated in the study were homicides, robberies, 
burglaries, auto larcenies, or forcible sex cases. 
Seeburger, who compiled the original Pittsburgh data, found that before Miranda 
in 54.4 % of cases police obtained a confession. After the Miranda decision that dropped 
-. -
31 % to 37.5%. (Seeburger, 1967: 11) More specifically, the confession rates for robbery 
and burglary dropped from 60% to 40%. The drop is even steeper in homicide cases. 
(Seeburger, 1967: 12) 
26 
Studies have established that in approximately 20% of all criminal cases a 
confession is necessary in gaining a conviction, and in the Pittsburgh study 25% of the 
cases observed necessitated a confession for conviction. (Seeburger, 1967: 15) Caplan 
argues that as Miranda decreases the number of confessions, the number of cases cleared 
will decrease because one-fourth of the cases require a confession and will be lost. 
In showing how important a waiver of Miranda rights is to acquiring a conviction, 
a second study recorded by Caplan was in "Seaside City," a large beach town in Los 
Angeles County. In this study of 478 files of data compiled by Witt in 1973, including 
before-and-after Miranda cases, an interrogations was necessary, or essential, in 24 % of 
the cases in acquiring a conviction, and succeeded in producing incriminating evidence in 
67% of cases. (Witt, 1973: 324) Caplan argues once again that if Miranda lowers the 
frequency with which suspects talk to police, convictions will decrease. 
A third study was done in New Haven, Connecticut, a town with a low crime 
rate. This study interviewed fifty-five lawyers who had defended seventy-five cases 
during early 1966. In forty-nine of those cases a confession was obtained, aiding in the 
conviction. This high level of confessions suggests the importance of confessions in the 
conviction process, and how tampering with the frequency of confessions would directly 
effect the conviction rates. 
Researchers in this study also discovered a 10% to 15% decline in the number of 
people who gave incriminating evidence from 1960-1966. The conclusion of this study 
states that" aggressive interrogation pays off in confessions." (Special, 1967: 1562) If 
officers are allowed to pursue a witness in an interrogation, they are more likely to be 




To study the application of Miranda in a real-world setting, David Neubauer did 
a post-Miranda study with a concentrated focus on one county of 120,000 residents. He 
was curious about Miranda's effect on the conviction rate, and the relationship between 
the number of cases in which confessions were challenged and the number of cases which 
lost confessions. Out of 248 cases on the docket of the criminal court serving the Illinois 
county, 114 involved defendants who had made an oral or written admission. Only 
seven of the confessions were challenged, and only one challenge was sustained. 
(Neubauer,1976: 166) This study shows a much lower rate of lost confessions, yet it 
must be reviewed with criticism. The bias in this sample comes from the fact that only 
one county of law enforcement was studied, with other counties unstudied possibly 
having different styles and methods in their practice. The study makes no reference to 
these possible variations between other counties, therefore its applicability remains 
questionable. 
Paul Cassell has been arguing for years that Miranda's effect has been costly. 
While these costs are easy to identify, they're harder to quantify. Cassell's empirical 
research suggests that Miranda significantly reduced the rate of confession 
He includes many studies in his reports. In the 1967 research effort in Pittsburgh 
mentioned above, confession rates dropped that year from 48% before Miranda to 32% 
after. (Seeburger, 1967: 12) In New York County, district Attorney Frank Hogan 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that confessions fell from 49% to 14% in 
that same year. (Controlling Crime, 1967) Similar effects were reported in Chicago, 
Kansas City, Brooklyn, and new Orleans. An estimated consensus of these studies 
suggests that, due to Miranda, there was a 16% decrease in the confession rates of all 
criminal cases in the United State. (Cassell, 1995: 31) This interprets into one in every six 
criminal cases resulting in a lost confession due to Miranda. (Cassell, 1996A: 416, and 
Cassell, 1996B: 304) 
Reliable confessions are necessary in approximately 24 % of all cases to obtain a 
conviction. (Cassell, 1996A: 433) Cassell multiplies the decrease in the rate of 
convictions (16%) by the percent of cases that require a conviction (24%) to show that 
about 3.8% of the criminal cases are lost due to Miranda. (Cassell, 1996A: 438) 
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From this point, by applying the FBI index crimes statistics, 28,000 violent crimes 
(murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery) are lost, 79,000 serious property crimes 
(burglary, larceny, and car theft) are not successfully solved, and 500,000 cases for crimes 
outside the FBI crime index are lost per year due to Miranda. (Cassell, 1996A: 440) 
Most of Cassell's early calculations were based on before-and-after studies done 
immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in favor of Miranda. He has 
broadened his conclusions by extending his studies into the 1990s. Evidence on 
confessions rates since 1967 have been spotty, but the studies with validity have shown 
that confession rates have failed to return to pre-Miranda rates. Before Miranda, 
confessions rates were around 55% to 60%. A study of six cities, done in 1977, reported a 
confession rate of 40%. (LaFree, 1985: 289) In 1993, a study from Berkeley found that 
detectives we successful in getting suspects to waive their rights in 64 % of the cases. 
Thirty-nine percent of these waivers resulted in a confession. (Leo, 1994) Cassell's study 
in 1994, in Salt Lake City, Utah, reports a confession rate of only 33%. (Cassell, 1996C: 
926) These data, referred to by Cassell as the limited few to be taken seriously, show that 
post-Miranda confession rates are lower than in the years before. 
Some would argue that the reason confessions fell was that police were forced to 
give up unconstitutional, coercive techniques of interrogation. Historically, however, as 
the result of the due process "voluntariness" test, questionable interrogations began to 
decline in the 1930s and 1940s. (Leo, 1992: 38) By the 1950s, according to leading 
scholars, the number of coercive incidents had diminished considerably. (Leo, 1992: 51) 
An additional way to analyze Miranda's effect, is by studying clearance rates 
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which are the rates at which police solve crimes. These figures would aid in analyzing 
police effectiveness. The Federal Bureau of Investigation collects such statistics and 
publishes them in their Uniform Crime Reports. The statistics on clearance rates have been 
viewed to reveal interesting effects resulting from Miranda. 
The data published in the Uniform Crime Reports show a strong decline in 
clearance rates immediately following 1966, the year of the Miranda decision. From 1950 
to 1965, the violent crime clearance rates hovered stable around or above 60%. Following 
Miranda, in the first three years, the rates fell from 60% in 1965, to 55% in 1966, to 51 % in 
1967, to 47% in 1968, to 46% in 1969. The violence crime clearance rates have, since then, 
consistently stayed around 45%. (Fox, 1978: 83) 
While Paul Cassell believes Miranda caused the large drop in clearance rates, 
there are other factors that must be considered. For example, crime increased 
significantly during the 1960s. An increase in crime would increase the work load of 
police agencies, reducing their effectiveness. However, Cassell downplays this factor by 
arguing that in order for this factor to explain the substantial three-year change in 
clearance rates, crime rates would have to rise sharply from 1966 to 1968 while remaining 
stable before and after these years. Statistics show that crime rates were increasing long 
before the Miranda decision, and continued to climb afterwards, reducing its apparent 
effectiveness on clearance rates. (Cassell, 1996B: 307) 
Other factor to be considered are the reduction of police officers in numbers 
available to solve crimes, an increase in crime-prone youth due to the baby boom, falling 
real dollar expenditures on crime fighting during times of high inflation, and increases in 
the unemployment rates. Paul Cassell has studied all these statistics, and has ruled them 
out as having noticeable effects resulting in a one-time change during the 1966 to 1968 
period, as would be necessary to claim responsibility for the decrease in clearance rates. 




Stephen Schulhofer takes a much different view in his studies, claiming that 
Miranda has not burdened the efforts of law enforcement officers in any way. "Common 
sense," he says, has been the basis for the belief in Miranda's restrictions, and he believes 
if the empirical data is studied, his conclusions will reflect his beliefs. By looking at his 
evidence, he shows that Miranda's supposed harmful effects fail to materialize. The rules 
of Miranda, he says, are porous, and police have gotten quite good at acquiring waivers. 
(Schulhofer, 1997: 352) 
Professor Cassell's arguments placed great emphasis on police officials' negative 
reactions to Miranda in the late 1960s. Schulhofer counters with studies in the 1970s that 
show these views had dissipated. In fact, for the past twenty years, police officials have 
expressed the opposite view, that Miranda does not burden law enforcement. 
(Schulhofer,1996B: 561) It stands to reason that officials would not have these views if 
they noticed a decrease in their effectiveness due to the warnings. 
Schulhofer claims that one of Cassell's empirical mistakes was excluding data 
taken from Los Angeles in a post-Miranda study. In this case, more confessions were 
obtained after Miranda than before. Professor Cassell claims that variances in the 
methodology of this study warranted him dropping the research, but Schulhofer strikes 
back saying that when a study shows a drop in the confession rate, methodology looses 
its importance to Cassell. (Schulhofer, 1997: 354) 
In his Salt Lake County research, in 1994, Professor Cassell reported a 42% rate at 
which suspects questioned gave a confession or incriminating statement. He suggests 
this rate is low in comparison to pre-Miranda levels. However, according to Schulhofer, 
Cassell fails to mention that his own research shows a pre-Miranda confession rate 
ranging from 40% to 45%. This figure appeared even lower in cities such as Philadelphia, 
Brooklyn, the District of Columbia, New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Baltimore. (Cassell, 
1996A: 459) In addition, if incriminating statements were added into the data, as 
---
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necessary for a valid comparison, the success rate in Salt Lake County's custodial 
interrogations increases to at least 54%, exceeding results recorded before Miranda. 
(Schulhofer, 1996B: 509) 
31 
Cassell made the mistake, in his Salt Lake City study, of assuming, without 
justification, that many of the suspects studied would have eventually incriminated 
themselves because they would not have the power to stop an interrogation once started. 
According to Peter Arenella, this is problematic both empirically and normatively. 
(Arenella,1997: 377) A researcher would have to account for the number of suspects 
who halted an interrogation or who did not confess after waiving their rights. 
Schulhofer also attacks Professor Cassell's conclusions made on clearance rates, 
the percentage of crimes that police are able to solve. Schulhofer does not argue that 
clearance rates dropped, but he disputes the cause of the drops. In his opinion clearance 
rates declined as a reflection of the decline in the criminal justice system's clearance 
capacity. He claims that the dramatic change in clearance capacity provides the most 
likely explanation for the decline in clearance rates, also occurring at the same time. 
(Schulhofer, 1997: 356) Graphically represented, the lines representing the clearance rate 
and clearance capacity run parallel, increasing and decreasing at similar stages in history. 
As capacity to clear drops, so does clearance, suggesting a strong direct relationship. 
In the mid-1960s, violent crime soared, but police resources increased at a much 
slower pace. The difference between the growth rate of violent crime and police 
resources widened dramatically after 1965. The spread stopped growing in 1969, just 
when the clearance rates stabilized. Actual figures for this fact show that in 1955 there 
was a clearance rate of 64%, according to Schulhofer. At that time 121 police officers 
were on the job for every 100 violent crimes. By 1970, the number of police officer 
personnel dropped from 121 to 45, and in 1997 28 officers are recorded for every 100 
.-
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violent crimes, less than one-fourth of the number from the 1950s. (Schulhofer, 1996A: 
288) These numbers represent the effect of limited resources on the clearance capacity. 
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With a decline in resources came a decline in the number of officers and dollars 
available to investigate reported crimes. This would cause the capacity to solve crimes by 
the number of officers on the job to decrease also. (Schulhofer,1997: 360) The clearance 
rate per officer has increased significantly. From 1962 to 1969 officers became statistically 
responsible for twice as many crimes to clear. While officers may have become more 
efficient, the clearance rate dropped because the number of crimes increased at a greater 
rate than officers, due to financial limits in resources. 
Another important figure to be conscious of is the actual number of crimes 
cleared. The number of violent crimes cleared per year has risen over time, beginning a 
steep incline in 1962. By studying the years and the number of crimes cleared, Miranda 
had no visible effect on the number of crimes cleared. The increase remained constant 
after 1962, not decreasing immediately after 1966 which is the year of the Miranda 
decision. 
Richard Leo has also published a record of data on the subject of Miranda. His 
study, one of the first thorough and valid ones done, was based on over 200 police 
interrogations, and more than nine months of participant observation field work inside 
the criminal investigation divisions of three police departments. Richard Leo personally 
observed these cases, as they developed, in an effort to analyze Miranda's impact on the 
law enforcement community and its effectiveness. He observed in three cities with 
diverse population bases. (Leo, 1996A: 652) 
In his study, detectives delivered the Miranda warnings to all suspects legally 
mandated, 96% of the cases. In the 7 which the suspect did not receive their rights, the 
suspect was not in custody for the purpose of questioning. (Leo,1996A: 563) Therefore, 
--
-
there was no legal requirement for the Miranda warnings to be read in these cases. 
(Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444) 
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Out of the options for suspects to pursue once read their rights, 78% of the 
suspects waived their rights. Twenty-two percent of the suspects invoked their rights. If 
a suspect chose to embrace their rights, the interrogation was terminated. If the rights 
were waived, an interrogation began. (Leo,1996A: 664) 
In Justice Warren's Court, speculation had it that underprivileged suspects were 
less likely to be aware, and therefore less likely to invoke, their Constitutional rights. Leo 
learned that in his sample, the only variable with any noticeable effect was whether a 
suspect had prior convictions (p<.006). Suspects with no prior criminal record waived 
their rights 92% of the time. Suspects with prior misdemeanor convictions waived their 
rights 90% of the time. Suspects with prior felony convictions waived their rights only 
70% of the time. This data shows that prior offenders understood the importance of 
silence and claiming the right to a lawyer. (Leo,1996A: 655) 
Important to his study was discovering how the suspect's response affected the 
prosecutor's decision to continue pursuing a case. When a suspect waived their rights, 
the prosecutor charged them in 69% of the cases. When a suspect responded to the 
warnings by invoking their rights the prosecutor charged 73% of the time. This variance 
is too minimal to have much value in analyzing whether the prosecutor was swayed by a 
suspects response. (Leo, 1996A: 656) 
Leo found that those who waived their rights were more likely to get convicted 
by almost ten percent. If a suspect waived their rights they were convicted 63 % of the 
time. If they invoked their rights they were convicted in 53% of the cases. (Leo, 1996A: 
656) With this data, Leo proved the importance of confessions to officers in gaining 
convictions by prosecutors. If criminals studied this data they would learn that the 
-intelligent thing to do would be to invoke their rights, decreasing their chances of being 
found guilty. 
Equally important was a study to see how plea bargaining was affected. It is a 
suspect's confession that will affect a prosecutor's need to plea bargain. If efficiency is 
the primary concern, a suspect that talks can be encouraged to plea bargain, using their 
confession for leverage. 
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Here the statistical findings are significant, proving the latter suggestion in the 
previous paragraph that a suspect who waives their rights tends to plea bargain. In cases 
where the suspect responded to the Miranda warnings by waiving their rights, a plea 
bargain was arranged in 49% of the cases. In cases where suspects invoked their rights, 
plea bargains were only made in 24% of the cases. (Leo,1996A: 657) This statistic shows 
the importance of a suspect that communicates in obtaining clearance. This suggests that 
it is in the best interest of offenders to waive rights and receive a lesser sentence through 
plea bargaining. This, of course, only holds true if the prosecutor can't prove the case in 
court. 
Finally, sentencing is a concern. The more evidence presented the more serious 
the charges are that can be brought against an offender. With greater charges comes a 
more serious sentence that can be imposed. The more evidence, the more persuaded a 
judge or jury can be to punish severely. 
Leo found that those who invoke their rights and refuse to talk to officers receive 
stiffer sentences. For those who waived their rights, 37% received low severity 
punishments, with 12% receiving high severity punishments based on the seriousness of 
their crime. The offenders who invoked their rights received low severity sentences only 
28% of the time, and they received high severity sentences in 19% of the cases. (Leo, 
1996A: 658) Whether low cooperation angered judges and juries, or whether prosecutors 
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argued stronger and with more passion, the statistics show a substantial difference in the 
sentencing process. 
Leo (1996) has found that Miranda has placed little costs, if any, on the public. 
He states that Miranda does not increase the likelihood that potentially guilty suspects 
will not choose to cooperate with police. Following up on the public'S greatest fear of 
Miranda, his statistics suggest that the number of exclusions of evidence due to improper 
Miranda warnings is less than one percent. (Leo, 1994) 
According to Leo, Miranda results in a marginally lower conviction rate. He 
states that suspects who waive their Miranda rights were almost ten percent more likely 
to get convicted than their counterpart. Miranda also leads to a lower rate of identifying 
accomplices, clearing crimes, and recovering stolen property. 
In a qualitative analysis of his study, Richard Leo argues that police have 
adapted to Miranda's requirements by designing an environment in which a suspect, 
along with hearing their Constitutional rights, will waive their rights and confess. He 
states that the long-term effects of Miranda on policing has been to alter the practice and 
ideology of the interrogation, despite the high waiver rate. 
Another way to analyze the effects of Miranda is to compare the current conviction rates 
with those in other countries, who follow different approaches to regulate police 
interrogations. Since Miranda, American police obtain confessions in perhaps 40 percent 
of all cases. Police are much most successful in other countries. In Great Britain, 
following the "Judges' Rules," which allow only limited advice on rights, confession rates 
were estimated from 61 to 85 percent. Confession rates in Canada appear to be 




Overall assessment of arguments and assertions 
As previously mentioned, the founding fathers implemented a due process 
emphasis in the Constitution of the United States, and the people embraced this 
structural design because they too had felt injustice and recognized the need to control 
government. However, the times have changed and today the search for justice faces 
different obstacles. The courts of America overflow with cases, limiting the effectiveness 
of the judicial system and, in tum, limiting the effectiveness of law enforcement. 
In addressing the 119 Annual Congress of the American Correctional 
Association, Maryland House of Delegates Representative Timothy Maloney said in his 
opening speech, "Today, in nearly every city and every state, our prisons and jails are 
exploding." (Maloney, 1989: 122) Overcrowding represents an important and 
demanding obstacle because the citizens of the United States believe that due to the 
limited resources available to the criminal justice system guilty criminals walk away from 
crimes unpunished, and they believe that the frequency of such incidents continues to 
rise. 
This perception brought on the Crime Control mentality. As the public perceives 
more and more criminals escaping accountability they feel a greater threat of danger. As 
they sense a greater chance of danger their fear turns into concern and popular opinion 
has begun a shift. It seems that this desire to live in a safe society is gaining momentum 
and public awareness. The fact that people now build walls around their communities 
represents a growing concern for the criminal justice system. The obvious question 
becomes, should citizens live in fear and threat of crime in order to maintain that the 
criminally accused receive the greatest protection of justice and opportunity for acquittal 
allowed under the constitution. Some people seem to believe this represents an unfair 
exchange of rights and now cry out for a new analysis to be made of the weights that 
should be placed on these opposing goals of the criminal justice system. 
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Most Americans are willing to limit and adjust some of their individual rights in 
exchange for improved public safety. Amitai Etzioni suggests that only minor changes 
need implemented to achieve noticeable results. (Etzioni, 1991: 4) If these changes could 
be identified, the majority would willingly sacrifice for a more secure future. 
Judge Wachtler beckons, in his article Reflections, for other judges, as educated 
and powerful people, not to be influenced by these people calling for more victim's 
rights. He says it is their responsibility to maintain the balance, and ensure that certain 
rights are not eroded. His argument turns to focus on what he considers the root 
problem. The judicial system can push criminals as severely as desired, but this will not 
stop crime. The only answer is education. 
The Founding Fathers founded this country on the democratic principles, but 
they provided for elected representatives to ensure that educated decisions were made. 
Where should the balance hang between majority wants and the actual decisions made? 
In closing an article addressed to his legal peers, Judge Sol Wachtler promotes judges 
following their legal conscience with more conviction than that used in catering to 
popular opinion. 
The immediate challenge for the bench and bar, again, is to remember 
that we have a sacred obligation with respect to protecting individual 
liberties - not by caving in to the will of the majority, because we won't 
be measured by what we do to cater to that will. We'll be measured by 
what we do to protect the rights of individuals. (Wachtler,1991: 74) 
Professor Henderson, author of "The Wrongs of Victim's Rights", also cautions 
against losing the traditional focus of the justice system when attention shifts toward the 
victim. She suggests that the popular image of a victim has become a blameless person, 
one which we all can identify with. This results in an over-sympathetic, emotional 
public, willing to blindly create rights for victims without considering their effects on 
defendants. (Henderson, Wrongs) 
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Miranda has continued to develop in the 1990s. In Minnick v. Mississippi, in 1990, 
the Court expanded its Miranda decision. The question was whether, once a defendant 
had consulted with counsel, could police resume questioning if counsel was not present. 
The Court held that once a defendant in custody declines to talk to police without a 
lawyer, police can not initiate questioning again without the lawyer present. This 
decision brought out a major argument about Miranda's effect. The judges in dissent 
complained the decision was, in effect, II an effort to protect suspects against what is 
regarded as their own folly. The sharp-witted criminal would know better than to 
confess; why should the dull-witted suffer for his lack of mental endowment?" 
Judge Scalia added, "Even if I were to concede that an honest confession is a 
foolish mistake, I would welcome rather than reject it; a rule that foolish mistakes do not 
count would leave most offenders not only unconvicted but undetected." He continued 
to say that rulings such as these barred confessions that would make society safer and 
serve to rehabilitate an offender. (Stewart, 1991: 43) 
According to Carol Steiker, the Supreme Court has added decisions since 
Miranda that encourage police officers to violate the warnings established in 1966 
whenever the benefits of the violation outweigh the cost of compliance. In Harris v. New 
York the Court ruled that the state could use suspects' statements taken in violation of the 
Miranda mandates to "impeach" their credibility if they attempt to testify on their own 
behalf. (Harris v. New York, 222) Oregon v. Elstad allows the state to use "evidentiary 
fruit" of most Miranda violations in its case in chief. Oregon also encourages officers to 
delay in delivering the warnings because the exclusion of unwarned statements does not 
require that the suspect cannot repeat their confession after hearing their rights. (Oregon 
v. Elstad, 298) If a suspect confesses before officers read the Miranda warnings, they will 
be more willing to repeat their confession 
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On the other hand, other scholars argue that American police have responded to 
the Miranda requirements by developing new, more sophisticated interrogation strategies 
based on manipulation, deception, and persuasion. According to some interpretations of 
research, their new strategies have been just as effective as the early ones. (Leo, 1994) 
Modern interrogation techniques resemble the structure of a classic confidence games. 
This helps to explain why custodial suspects waive their rights, an unintelligent thing to 
do. 
In their modern techniques, officers create the appearance to suspects that the 
two parties are on equal ground. Once offenders are pumped up, the persuasion by 
police begins. Miranda has transformed police power with little or no effect on confession 
rates, according to Schulhofer. Police have embraced Miranda as a legitimating symbol of 
their professionalism. (Leo, Police) At the same time it has inspired police to create new 
strategies for the interrogation room, allowing them to act as confident men and to 
develop their skills in human manipulation and deception. Leo states: 
Driven by careful strategic considerations, police interrogators exercise 
power by manipulating custodial suspects' definition of the situation and 
of their role; by creating the appearance of a symbiotic rather than an 
adversarial relationship; by appealing to their insider knowledge and 
expertise; and by exploiting the suspects' ignorance, fear and trust. (Leo, 
1996B: 285) 
The Constitution does not refer specifically to "confessions" or 
"admissions," voluntary or involuntary. It does not state that a convictions based 
on a coerced confession cannot stand. It does not extend itself to say that 
convictions based on a coerced confession must be over-turned, no matter what 
the evidence, which is a rule known as the "rule of automatic reversal." 
(Amsterdam,1970: 805) These concepts have developed as judges attempt to 






In studying the truthfulness of confessions and their usefulness in the criminal 
justice system, scholars have discovered that if a coerced confession turns out to be 
trustworthy, in that instance coercion advances the search for truth. This shows the 
positive potential of coercion. Some people feel this positive benefit could be used in 
trial. Permitting the use of coerced confessions, however, would eliminate the guarantee 
against unconstitutional police interrogations. This leads to the question, is there a way 
to allow necessary, yet coerced, confessions to remain as evidence and still protect 
Constitutional rights. (Kamisar, 1990: 548) Are there available alternatives to the 
Miranda mandates which also educate the public and protect their Fifth Amendment 
rights? 
Prior to Miranda, various state laws made it a criminal act to deny a lawyer the 
opportunity to meet with a suspect in custody, or to fail to notify the relatives of an 
arrestee. Other state laws penalized police officers attempting to solicit confessions by 
violence, threats, or other objectionable means. Add the fact that false imprisonment and 
assault are tort offenses, and these make up potential remedies to unconstitutional police 
behavior. (Kamisar, 1990: 548) 
The problem with excluding evidence is that it "is a remedy which directly serves 
only to protect those upon whose person or premises something incriminating has been 
found." Why not admit confessions which, although coerced, are verifiable? Let the 
"remedies of private action" and the internal discipline of police forces, carried out under 
the watchful eye of the public deal with these violations. This would promote justice 
while discouraging unconstitutional behavior. (Wolfv. Colorado, 31) 
For their stated reasons, the Court has ruled in favor of excluding evidence and 
has chosen to overlook the alternatives above. Perhaps they are trying to safeguard the 
public, not allowing the government to profit from its wrongdoing. Perhaps it feels the 
"natural way" to respond to such a violation is to "nullify" it. Perhaps their ruling is 
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designed to maintain respect for the Constitution, using its decisions as a symbol of 
dedication to individual rights. Perhaps these alternative remedies used before Miranda 
were difficult to enforce, being inconsistent. 
Justice Traynor wrote the majority opinion on the California Supreme Court case, 
in 1955, that adopted the concept of excluding illegally obtained evidence and 
confessions. He explained, in later writings, that his concerns grew as time after time he 
observed illegally obtained evidence being offered and admitted, as a routine procedure. 
He accepted that occasionally an officer would make a mistake, forcing illegally obtained 
evidence to be admitted to get a conviction. To him, though, it was quite different when 
such practices became common. For him, these observations led up to the great measure 
of rejecting all illegal evidence. "It had become all to obvious that unconstitutional police 
methods of obtaining evidence were not being deterred in any other way," he writes. 
(Traynor, 1962: 321) 
In the opinion of Yale Kamisar, if Congress enacted a statute replacing current 
rules of exclusion with a "streamlined tort remedy" to what we now refer to as Miranda 
violations which would establish consistent punitive rulings for violating officers, few 
people would complain. Under this situation, if such a remedy were designed, the 
"extreme sanctions of exclusion" would no longer warrant themselves necessary or 
appropriate. No longer could case dismissal "pay its way." (Kamisar, 1990: 562) In 
reality, though, according to the classic article on the subject, the overwhelming 
consensus is that civil suits, criminal prosecution, injunctions, review boards, and internal 
police discipline are poor, inadequate replacements for current requirements. (Foote, 
1955: 493) 
In an argument against civil tort remedies taken against violating officers, 
Professor Dripps writes on a report put out by the United States Department of Justice in 
1986. This report, titled Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary 
--
42 
Rule, identifies two reasons why the civil solution would fail. First, juries tend to 
sympathize with the police and not with criminals, introducing a bias into the system 
which would limit justice. Second, obtaining evidence illegally does not create damages 
that the civil court system can adequately compensate. (Dripps, 1990: 629) 
Many years after Miranda, Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote that "the cost" of their 
decision is that "some voluntary statements will be excluded." Justice Marshall 
continued on the idea when he wrote, "No sane person would knowingly relinquish a 
right to be free of compulsion." Here is where a potential problem develops. According 
to Leo (1996) suspects do continue to choose to waive their Constitutional rights. Leo's 
figures show that both Justices were wrong. So is Judge Rothwax when he claims that, 
"In our system, a man or woman who takes responsibility must be crazy!" (Rothwax, 
1996: 79) By looking at Leo's data, either Rothwax and the Supreme Court Justices 
Brennan and Marshall miscalculated, or there are a great number of "crazy people" being 
arrested. 
Conclusion 
To put Miranda in perspective, if, as stated by Uviller, 75% to 80% of convictions 
in major crimes depend upon confessions, think of the devastating potential effect on 
criminal justice if every suspect exercised their Constitutional rights and gave no 
confession. (Uviller,1996: 130) The importance of reliable confessions and interrogation 
techniques becomes frighteningly clear. 
The two dominant scholars, Paul Cassell and Stephen Schulhofer, agree that only 
a small percentage of suspects actually assert their Miranda rights. However, Cassell 
believes the Court exceeded its boundaries by placing" shackles" on the police with 
Miranda safeguards that give criminal suspects far more protection than they deserve. 
--
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According to him, even one lost incriminating admission exceeds what society should 
have to tolerate. 
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Schulhofer prefers to see Miranda as an appropriate constitutional response to a 
difficult problem, a response that represents an improvement over prior mandates on the 
issue of Fifth Amendment rights. According to Schulhofer, when a great deal of effort is 
put into blaming Miranda for problems in the criminal justice system, it disparages the 
importance of criminal justice resources and the number of police officers on the street. 
This serves the victims of crime poorly. It creates a dangerous diversion from the issues 
that actually affect the safety of streets and the quality of civilization. (Schulhofer, 1997: 
348) According to him, if society cares about present and future victims, it must insist 
that debates focus on issues that make a difference, and Miranda is not one of them. 
Why does such a controversy surround the awareness of rights? Because, tracing 
back in history, individual rights were the basis of the country. They were the motivation 
for its founders. In the judicial system, the rights to due process and to counsel represent 
substantial factors that playa role in a conviction. As Justice Blackmun points out, "The 
lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability to 
protect ... a client under custodial interrogation." In this legal system, "whether it is a 
minor or an adult who stands accused, the lawyer is the one person to whom society as a 
whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the 
police and the courts." (Fare v. Michael, 719) 
When looking for alternatives to the Miranda mandates, many people become 
frustrated. Due to the bureaucratic nature of the government, flexibility is non-existent, 
which translates into limited change. The energy of potential legal innovators gets 
drained, as claimed by Marvin Wolfgang. He says that the bureaucracy of the United 




system into rigidity, rationalization for faults, and intellectual banality. (Wolfgang, 1972: 
21) These obstacles restrict optimism on future reform of these issues. 
Even if the Court overruled Miranda, police would have to continue to advise 
people of their rights. According to Professor Israel, the concept of public education is an 
important part in establishing the voluntariness of a confession. (Israel, 1977: 1386) 
Many scholars agree the Miranda decision is a symbol. It is an important symbol 
of the criminal procedures the citizens are guaranteed. Such a symbol is II a gesture of 
government's willingness to treat the lowliest antagonist as worthy of respect and 
consideration." (Caplan, 1985: 1471) 
To quote Stephen Schulhofer, in a passage that suggests he sometimes shifts his 
opinion under different arguments and circumstances, he responds to the issue of how 
aggressive the Miranda decision was in dealing with Fifth Amendment rights: 
I am not so sure. Miranda undoubtedly serves important symbolic 
functions. It also affords certain concrete advantages over the due 
process test. .. Miranda does not (however) ... come directly to grips with 
the dilemma arising from our simultaneous commitments to the privilege 
against self-incrimination and to a law enforcement system in which 
police interrogation is perceived as a necessity. If anything, Miranda's 
technique for denying this dilemma, for insuring that we can have our 
cake and eat it, is infinitely less candid than the due process balancing 
analysis .... Seen as a compromise, Miranda is well worth retaining. 
Whether Miranda represents the best possible compromise, and indeed 
whether compromise is required at all, remain open questions. 
(Schulhofer,1981: 883) 
The empirical evidence on this issue has been interpreted to portray Miranda in 
both a positive and negative light. Whichever has the most validity, the most important 
thing is that the United States citizens and law enforcement officers accept the Miranda 
requirements and integrate them into their daily practice. It is only through consistent 
use that the criminal justice system can run smoothly and effectively until either more 
clear results are discovered, or a much more popular and reliable method for 
guaranteeing citizen's rights becomes evident. 
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